Finally a plan for Gaza
Today Nikolay Mladenov, Representing the Board of Peace published a 15-point plan of action that for the first time provides a coherent and comprehensive Road Map for moving forward with the reconstruction of Gaza. The plan addresses the requirement that both Israel and Hamas fulfill their commitments under the agreement to end the war in Gaza. This includes a phased and logical mechanism for disarmament, the transference of government and all authorities in Gaza to the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, humanitarian aid issues, reconstruction and Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. This is a plan that Israel and Hamas should agree to and its implementation should begin immediately. It has taken a long time to present such a plan and there are probably elements in it that are not fully defined and there may be some points absent from it – but this is the best starting point for reversing what has been happening in Gaza since the official end of the war.
Mladenov and his team deserve to hear positive feedback on this important step. Now heavy pressure by the US on Israel and by Qatar, Egypt and Turkiye on Hamas must be applied to ensure the full implementation of the plan.
15 Point plan for Gaza
Nickolay E. MLADENOV
May 22.2026
Following today’s #UN Security Council briefing, I am publishing the core elements of the proposed 15-point “Roadmap to Complete the Implementation of President Trump’s Gaza Comprehensive Peace Plan” in plain language. • Points 1–5: Principles • Points 6–11: Security • Points 12–14: International Stabilization Force and IDF Withdrawal • Point 15: Reconstruction
Point 1: Commitment to #UNSC Resolution 2803 and the Comprehensive Plan
What this means: This point defines the purpose of the entire process. The objective is not simply to preserve a ceasefire. It is to move Gaza out of a permanent cycle of war and humanitarian collapse toward recovery, reconstruction and Palestinian self-governance. It is built around restoring civilian life, rebuilding Gaza’s economy and institutions, and creating a credible pathway toward Palestinian self-determination and statehood. Palestinians are entitled to know where this process is meant to lead.
Point 2: Completion of Existing Ceasefire Obligations
What this means: This point exists because implementation cannot move forward while commitments already made under the ceasefire remain incomplete. The measures promised at the start of the ceasefire, including humanitarian aid, fuel, crossings, shelter, and the measures included in the Sharm el-Sheikh understandings, must be implemented before moving to the next stage. The purpose here is to ensure that implementation applies to all parties and that obligations are fulfilled in sequence. The proposal is built around reciprocity: obligations by one side are linked to obligations by the other, with implementation verified step by step by an Implementation Verification Committee (IVC).
Point 3: Verification Before Moving Forward
What this means: This point is built around a tragic reality -- trust between Israelis and Palestinians is effectively non-existent. The process therefore does not rely on promises alone. Each obligation by one side triggers an obligation by the other, and every stage must be independently verified before the process can move forward. No party is expected to take irreversible steps simply on the assumption that the other side will follow through later. The purpose of the verification mechanism is to make reciprocity operational and measurable, step by step.
Point 4: Role of the @BoardOfPeace, Office of the High Representative (OHR) and the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza @NCAG)
What this means: This point explains the transitional structure established under Resolution 2803 and how the civilian transition in Gaza would function. The National Committee for the Administration of Gaza would serve as the Palestinian-led civilian administration responsible for governing Gaza during the transition period. The OHR is intended to connect the BoP to the NCAG and coordinate the civilian, reconstruction and security tracks of the implementation process. The broader purpose of this structure is to support a transition toward unified Palestinian civilian governance while reconstruction and stabilization efforts are underway. The Board of Peace and the OHR are temporary international mechanisms designed to support and coordinate the transition, not to permanently replace Palestinian governance. The NCAG is therefore intended to function as the transitional Palestinian civilian authority during implementation until a reformed Palestinian Authority can resume its responsibilities.
Point 5: Hamas and Governance
What this means: This point separates armed factions from governing institutions while also protecting ordinary civil servants and public employees. Gaza cannot recover while armed groups simultaneously operate as governing authorities. At the same time, this point does not seek collective punishment or the removal of ordinary public workers from civilian life. The Roadmap explicitly states that civil servants are to be treated lawfully, fairly and with dignity. What is intended to end is governance through armed structures, not the livelihoods of public servants.
Point 6: One Authority, One Law, One Weapon
What this means: This point establishes the governing principle of the transition: that only authorized Palestinian institutions would exercise security authority inside Gaza; only authorized personnel carry weapons, armed groups cease military activity, and governance and security structures become unified under one civilian authority. No society can sustainably recover while multiple armed structures operate alongside civilian institutions.
Point 7: Police Reform and Integration
What this means: This point focuses on rebuilding civilian policing and preventing a security vacuum during the transition. The Roadmap calls for vetting police personnel, integrating trained officers into civilian structures, offering non-armed roles or compensation where appropriate, and transferring police weapons to NCAG control as soon as it enters the Gaza Strip. The objective is to rebuild law enforcement gradually and professionally while maintaining public order and avoiding institutional collapse. A successful transition cannot happen if civilian policing disappears before stable institutions are in place.
Point 8: Gradual Decommissioning
Process What this means: The proposal does not call for immediate surrender or unilateral disarmament. It outlines a phased, Palestinian-led and internationally verified process carried out gradually and according to an agreed timetable. Weapons are not transferred to Israel. The proposal explicitly states that weapons would transfer to Palestinians operating under the NCAG with international monitoring arrangements. The process is designed to happen incrementally, sector by sector, alongside reciprocal implementation steps, including gradual Israeli withdrawal and the expansion of reconstruction activity. Gaza cannot sustainably recover while multiple armed structures continue operating alongside civilian governance institutions.
Point 9: Personal Weapons Under Palestinian Law
What this means: This point distinguishes between organized militant infrastructure and personal weapons. Under the Roadmap, the NCAG would become the sole Palestinian authority responsible for registering weapons, issuing licenses, revoking licenses, and collecting unlicensed weapons. The process would happen gradually through buy-back programs, reintegration assistance, and social support mechanisms. The purpose is to move weapons regulation into Palestinian legal institutions rather than leaving it fragmented across multiple armed structures.
Point 10: Conditions for Surrendering Personal Weapons
What this means: This point is intended to address fears about personal safety during the transition period. No one will be required to give up their personal weapon until appropriate security and implementation milestones are met and verified by the authorized bodies. This ensures that personal safety is protected throughout the transition. The process is therefore designed to happen alongside the establishment of functioning security arrangements, not before them. The broader goal is to prevent instability, fear and security collapse during implementation.
Point 11: Social Peace Agreement
What this means: This point seeks to prevent internal Palestinian violence during the transition. The Roadmap includes commitments to stop internal killings, prohibit reprisals, ban armed demonstrations, and end displays of armed force. The objective is to ensure that the transition does not become a cycle of revenge, retaliation or factional conflict.
Point 12: International Stabilization Force (ISF)
What this means: This point establishes the role of the International Stabilization Force as a temporary buffer and support mechanism during implementation. Under the Roadmap, the ISF would deploy between Israeli and Palestinian-controlled areas, protect humanitarian operations, and support the decommissioning process. The force is not intended to govern or police Gaza. The NCAG remain responsible for policing and civilian administration. The purpose of the ISF is to reduce friction during the transition and support stability while Palestinian transitional institutions assume responsibility on the ground.
Point 13: Phased Israeli Withdrawal
What this means: This point links Israeli withdrawal directly to verified implementation of the decommissioning process. The Roadmap commits Israel to a phased withdrawal on an agreed timetable, tied to verified progress on decommissioning and ISF deployment. The principle behind this arrangement is reciprocity. As implementation progresses: Israeli forces withdraw, the Palestinian-led NCAG assumes responsibility, reconstruction expands, and civilian governance increases.
Point 14: Palestinian Responsibility in Certified Areas
What this means: This point transfers responsibility for maintaining security in certified and fully decommissioned areas to Palestinian civilian authorities under the NCAG. The broader objective is to move Gaza gradually toward governance and security administration under Palestinian transitional institutions rather than under military confrontation or parallel armed structures.
Point 15: Reconstruction
What this means: This point connects large-scale reconstruction directly to verified stability and civilian administration. Financing and major rebuilding efforts will not move forward sustainably in areas where parallel armed structures remain active and instability persists. The Roadmap links reconstruction to verified implementation, civilian governance, and functioning administration under the NCAG. Gaza cannot move from emergency humanitarian relief to genuine long-term recovery unless there is stability, functioning civilian institutions, reconstruction access, and confidence that rebuilding efforts can be sustained. The faster implementation progresses, the faster Gaza can begin rebuilding homes, schools, hospitals, infrastructure and economic life at scale.

Another plan?! Another international farce! One result is given, more Palestinians will be slaughtered, fast and slow.
chatgpt’s response on the Israel’s minimal security needs. 1. Disarmament: “verifiable, complete, and irreversible” (not phased ambiguity)
What the plan says
Gradual, phased decommissioning
Weapons transferred under Palestinian oversight (NCAG)
International monitoring and verification
What Israel would likely require instead
Clear definition of “total demilitarisation”
Not just Hamas as a governing body, but:
no rocket capability
no tunnel networks
no weapons manufacturing capacity
no organized armed factions
Irreversibility requirement
destruction (not storage) of major weapons systems
verified dismantling of production infrastructure
External enforcement fallback
Israel would likely insist it retains the right to act militarily if:
hidden arsenals are discovered
rearmament is detected
👉 Core gap: The plan assumes verification is sufficient; Israel would want enforceable certainty plus unilateral enforcement fallback.
2. Security freedom of action (Israeli “override clause”)
What the plan implies
International Stabilization Force (ISF) provides stability
Verification committee manages compliance
Transition reduces Israeli military role over time
What Israel would likely require
Explicit right of self-defence operations inside Gaza
even after withdrawal
especially against rearmament or emerging threats
Freedom to operate against “ticking threats”
tunnels
weapons factories
leadership planning attacks
No exclusive reliance on ISF
Israel would not delegate its security entirely to multinational forces
👉 Core gap: The plan assumes international structures can replace Israeli security control; Israel would treat them as supplementary, not substitutive.
3. Withdrawal conditions: “security first, timeline second”
What the plan says
Phased Israeli withdrawal tied to verified milestones
What Israel would likely require
No fixed timetable
withdrawal only after complete operational benchmarks, not dates
Phased withdrawal with rollback triggers
if violations occur → automatic re-entry or pause of withdrawal
Security buffer zones retained for longer periods
especially along the border (Gaza envelope)
👉 Core gap: The plan links withdrawal to process; Israel would demand withdrawal only after outcome certainty, not procedural progress.
4. Governance guarantee: exclusion of Hamas “soft return”
What the plan says
Hamas separated from governance
Civil servants protected
NCAG transitional authority
What Israel would likely require
Hard legal prohibition on Hamas political participation
Full vetting of NCAG personnel
exclusion of anyone linked to Hamas/security wings
Security service restructuring under external supervision
Anti-infiltration mechanisms
intelligence-sharing with Israel
continuous screening, not one-time vetting
👉 Core gap: Israel would worry about institutional rebranding of Hamas influence rather than elimination.
5. Enforcement authority inside Gaza (who actually controls force)
What the plan says
Palestinian police rebuilt
NCAG becomes civilian authority
ISF supports stability
What Israel would likely require
Security monopoly not solely Palestinian-controlled during transition
shared or externally supervised policing in sensitive areas
Arms control authority beyond NCAG
Israel and/or ISF veto over weapons licensing and enforcement
Joint operational coordination centre
real-time intelligence integration with Israel
👉 Core gap: Israel would not accept a fully sovereign Palestinian monopoly on force during transition.
6. International Stabilization Force: mandate expansion requirement
What the plan says
ISF buffers and supports transition
Not a governing force
What Israel would likely require
Robust enforcement mandate
authority to physically prevent rearmament
not just observe or report
Clear rules of engagement
including engagement with armed groups
Guaranteed composition standards
Israel would likely object to troops from states perceived as hostile or non-neutral
👉 Core gap: The plan envisions ISF as stabiliser; Israel would need it to function closer to a robust security enforcement force.
7. Verification mechanism: intelligence parity problem
What the plan says
Implementation Verification Committee (IVC)
Step-by-step reciprocal verification
What Israel would likely require
Access to raw intelligence integration
not just summaries or reports
Independent Israeli verification channel
Israel would not rely solely on third-party assessments
Dispute resolution mechanism favouring security urgency
i.e., Israel can act if verification is delayed or inconclusive
👉 Core gap: Israel relies heavily on intelligence superiority; it would not outsource final judgment.
8. Reconstruction safeguards (dual-use prevention)
What the plan says
Reconstruction linked to stability and governance
International funding
What Israel would likely require
Strict dual-use material control
cement, steel, engineering equipment tightly monitored
Real-time import tracking
Israel or trusted third party involved in customs supervision
Reconstruction conditionality tied to security compliance
immediate suspension if violations occur
👉 Core gap: Israel would treat reconstruction as a security instrument, not only humanitarian recovery.
9. Political and strategic guarantee: no “repeat cycle risk”
What Israel would implicitly require
Assurance that this is not a temporary truce before another escalation cycle
That translates into demands like:
long-term demilitarisation enforcement mechanism (multi-year or indefinite)
continuous monitoring beyond transition phase
legal/political framework preventing rapid rearmament
👉 Core gap: The plan is a transition roadmap; Israel wants a permanent strategic endpoint guarantee.
10. “Failure mode” protections (most important Israeli requirement)
This is the quiet but central issue.
Israel would likely require:
Clear definition of plan failure
what counts as violation
what triggers rollback or intervention
Automatic consequences
if disarmament stalls → withdrawal pauses
if weapons reappear → operations resume
No ambiguity in enforcement hierarchy
Israel retains ultimate security override authority
👉 Core gap: The plan is cooperative and staged; Israel would require a hard enforcement architecture with automatic escalation rights.
Bottom line
This plan is built around:
phased trust-building + international verification + gradual Israeli withdrawal
Israel’s baseline requirements would shift it toward:
irreversible demilitarisation + enforceable guarantees + retained Israeli security override
So the key mismatch is structural:
The plan assumes trust can be rebuilt through institutions
Israel would require trust to be replaced by enforceable, unilateral last-resort security guarantees